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A New Transatlantic Trade War? 
Six months after the Doha agreement on a new round of talks to liberalise world trade, 
tension is mounting between the EU and the US, the world's two major trading powers, 
giving rise to fears of a furl-blown transatlantic trade war and a new wave of global 
protectionism. The contributors to this Forum look at the causes of, and possible 
remedies for, this development, taking economic, legal and pofitical aspects into 
consideration. 
Richard Senti* 
Issues Surrounding the US-EU Steel Conflict 
F aced with the misery and destitution of the war just ended, the founding fathers of the new system for 
regulating world trade found in their Proposal for 
Expansion of World Trade and Employment 
(November 1945) that: "The fundamental choice is 
whether countries will struggle against each other for 
wealth and power, or work together for security and 
mutual advantage." Any new conflict arising between 
the major trading partners confronts them anew with 
this choice. This article on the international steel 
dispute which broke out in early March aims to sketch 
the development of the trade feud over time and then 
to critically assess the procedures chosen by the 
trading partners and the decisions they have taken, 
questioning these in the light of the world trading rules 
currently in operation. 
Timeline 
5 June 2001: US President George W. Bush 
announces a comprehensive initiative to respond to 
the challenges facing the US steel industry. As part of 
that initiative, President Bush directs the US Trade 
Representative Robert B. Zoellick to request the US 
International Trade Commission (ITC) to initiate an 
investigation under section 201 of the Trade Act of 
1974 into the effect of steel imports on the US steel 
industry. 
22 June 2001: Trade Representative Zoellick calls 
upon the ITC to clarify "whether certain steel products 
are being imported into the United States in such 
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of 
serious injury, or the threat thereof." 
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7 December 2001 : The ITC announces recommen- 
dations and views on remedy in its global safeguard 
investigation involving imports of steel, promising to 
issue its final report by the end of the month. 
20 December 2001: The ITC concludes from its 
investigation that certain steel products "are being 
imported into the United States in such increased 
quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious 
injury, or threat of serious injury, to the domestic 
industries producing like or directly competitive 
articles." The Commission proposes the estab- 
lishment of protective tariffs of up to 20% of an 
imported product's price, for a four-year period. 
5 March 2002: President Bush, on the basis of the 
ITC report, proclaims safeguard measures in the form 
of a tariff rate quota and an increase in duties on 
imports of certain steel products. The Annex to the 
Steel Products Proclamation, over 40 pages tong, lists 
the protective tariffs, ranging up to 30%, applying to 
specific steel product types. The president reserves 
the righ t "to reduce, to modify or to terminate" the 
safeguard measures if certain conditions are fulfilled. 
6 March 2002: The EU Commission puts forward a 
four-point programme in response to the United 
States' decision: 1) The EU will call upon the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) to condemn the United 
States. 2) It will consider safeguard measures of its 
own against diverted imports from third countries. 3) 
The EU challenges the USA to propose what 
measures it will take to compensate injured parties 
and, if it fails to make any concessions: 4) Punitive 
tariffs will be applied to certain US products. The WTO 
confirmed the receipt of the EU's complaint on 7 
March. 
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20 March 2002: The US safeguard measures come 
into force for a four-year period. 
20 March 2002: Under the auspices of the WTO, 
consultations take place between the United States 
and the EU, Brazil, New Zealand, Japan and South 
Korea. The negotiations show no immediate signs of 
success. If the consultations fail to produce any satis- 
factory result within 60 days, the EU is entitled to call 
for a wro  panel to be appointed. 
22 March 2002: The EU compiles a list of 300 US 
products that it currently imports. These are the 
products that would be subject to punitive tariffs if the 
United States persisted with its measures to protect 
the steel industry. 
27 March 2002: The EU resolves to apply an 
additional tariff of 15-26% on any steel imports from 
third countries that exceed the average import level 
for the last three years by more than 10%. 
3 April 2002: The EU's safeguard measures against 
imports from third countries come into force. 
19 April 2002: The EU publishes a proposed 
Council Regulation which would impose 100% 
punitive tariffs on certain US goods from 18th June 
2002 (the so-called "short" list providing customs 
revenues of E377 million), to be followed by tariffs of 
8-30% following a condemnation of the United States 
by the WTO (the "long" list with prospective customs 
revenues of s million). 
17 May 2002: Japan decides to impose 100% 
tariffs on steel imports from the USA worth $4.88 
million as of 18 June. 
Unsolved Procedural Issues 
Without presuming to judge the propriety of the 
procedures adopted by the disputing parties, the 
following will nevertheless highlight a number of 
procedural issues it might be interesting to discuss. 
The US Trade Representative's letter requesting the 
investigation and the ITC's interim and final reports all 
avoid any mention of consultations between the 
trading partners under the terms of Article 3 (1) of the 
WTO's Agreement on Safeguards. Though not neces- 
sarily at government level, prior consultations are in 
fact said to have occurred between the trading 
partners. 
The call for consultations made by the EU and other 
WTO members immediately after the announcement 
of the United States' safeguard measures, and their 
initiation of WTO dispute settlement procedures, is in 
accordance with the organisation's Agreement on 
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Safeguards and the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(Dispute Settlement Understanding). However, Article 
XIX (2) of the GA'I-I- states that a resolution such as 
that made by the EU, to apply quotas to third-country 
imports without prior consultation, beyond which 
supplementary tariffs will be imposed, can only be 
justified "in critical circumstances, where delay would 
cause damage which it would be difficult to repair". 
Whether or under what circumstances this might 
actually be the case is a difficult question to answer. 
Consultations with the parties affected are required to 
produce satisfactory evidence of likely "damage 
which it would be difficult to repair", so it is up to the 
EU to present a convincing case in this respect. 
A problematic item in procedural terms is the EU's 
Council Regulation imposing punitive tariffs on US 
merchandise. Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settle- 
ment Understanding stipulates that a party to a 
dispute may not seek the Dispute Settlement Body's 
permission to take counter-measures unless the Body 
has already made recommendations and decisions 
and these have failed to be fulfilled within a 
reasonable period of time. The author is not aware of 
any dispute managed by the WTO in which the panel 
or any other body resorted to by a complaining 
country has agreed to counter-measures being taken 
before proceedings have got under way. The United 
States has already charged the EU with acting in 
contravention of WTO rules, stating that a WTO 
decision must be taken before retaliatory measures 
can be contemplated and that one party cannot act 
"as judge and jury" at one and the same time. It is fair 
to assume that the disputing parties' actions and 
reactions seen in recent weeks are at least to some 
degree intended as no more than posturing. However, 
aware that it only takes a small spark or flame to start 
a devastating blaze, representatives of German 
industry in particular (The Association of German 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce - DIHK; The 
Federation of German Industry - BDI; The Federal 
Ministry of Economics) have been urging moderation, 
calling on the EU Commission to "put paid to [this 
dispute] flexibly and constructively, without damaging 
transatlantic cooperation as a whole" (DIHT press 
release). 
Legal Issues of Substance 
Overcoming the differences between the United 
States and its foreign steel suppliers in the current 
dispute will also entail resolving a number of 
substantive issues. The main such issues concern 
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proving that imports are a source of "serious injury" 
and/or a "threat of serious injury" to US manufac- 
turers, which involves establishing a causal link and, 
secondly, the problem of selectivity (i.e. departures 
from the "most-favoured-nation" principle). 
Article XlX of the GA3-1, the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards and the US Trade Agreement all concur 
that safeguards may be deployed "if ... any product is 
being imported ... in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or 
directly competitive products ..." The WTO defines 
serious injury as a "significant overall impairment in 
the position of a domestic industry", while a "threat of 
serious injury" is understood to mean a threat "based 
on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or 
remote possibility". On the basis of usage in US legis- 
lation, a distinction needs to be drawn between the 
term "serious injury" as used by the WTO and "major 
injury". The term "serious" is used when the injury 
concerned is one among other forms of injury 
occurring and, though significant, it is not the most 
significant of them. In contrast, a "major injury" would 
be the most significant among them. Thus the term 
chosen by the WTO assumes that, though excessive 
imports are injurious or pose the threat of injury to 
domestic producers, there may well be other factors 
contributing to the damage or threat besides the 
excessive imports. 
Proving damage is always difficult on the basis of 
economic statistics. Depending on how products are 
grouped (i.e. precisely which products a category 
includes or excludes) and whether a case is made in 
value or volume terms, vastly different conclusions 
can be drawn. The ITC, for example, points out that 
the total value of steel imports into the United States 
has grown by 25% in the last five years, from $10.2 to 
$12.8 billion, whereas the EU Commission calculates 
that the volume has remained virtually unchanged at 
28 million tonnes. The discrepancies between inter- 
pretations are even greater for specific product 
groups. Looking at the same five-year period, the ITC 
identifies some product groups (such as carbon and 
alloy pipe and tube) showing growth of a little over 
55% while imports of others (e.g. carbon and alloy flat 
products) grew just under 5%. in other words, 
depending on how categories are defined there is 
ample scope for "creative" grouping. All in all, the ITC 
defined 33 product groups, among which it found 
twelve groups for which imports were so excessive 
"that they are a substantial cause of serious injury or 
threat of serious injury". 
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Another issue which remains unresolved in the 
present dispute over steel is the justification for selec- 
tivity. Without any further explanation, item 11 of the 
US proclamation states that the safeguards will apply 
to imports from all countries with the exception of 
Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan. According to a 
letter by Robert B. Zoellick, the exception for the two 
fellow NAFTA members Canada and Mexico is attrib- 
utable to President Bush, who used the phrase 
"products from all sources other than Mexico and/or 
Canada" in his letter of instruction. The ITC then 
added its own proposal "that none of the additional 
tariffs or tariff-rate quotas apply to imports from Israel, 
or to any imports entered duty-free from beneficiary 
countries under the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act or the Andean Trade Preference Act". 
Referring to the US-Jordan Free Trade Area Imple- 
mentation Act, the ITC recommended that none of the 
additional tariffs be applied to imports from Jordan. In 
contrast to the United States, which grants prefer- 
ential treatment to its treaty partners, the EU has 
evidently chosen to take no heed of its existing trade 
agreements. Switzerland and Norway, which have had 
a free trade agreement with the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) since 1972 expressly 
forbidding tariffs on exports or imports, will be subject 
to the same EU punitive tariffs as all other countries. 
There are insufficient precedents to clarify the 
extent to which the most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
principle must be adhered to when safeguards are 
applied, or whether exceptions may be made to 
honour specific free trade agreements. Proponents of 
upholding the MFN principle base their case on the 
first sentence in the interpretational terms of the 
article on safeguards contained in the Havana Charter 
which never came into force. These state: "It is under- 
stood that any suspension, withdrawal or modification 
... must not discriminate against imports from any 
member ..." However, the proponents of selectivity go 
on just one sentence further in the same interpreta- 
tional passage, stating "... that such action should 
avoid, to the fullest extent possible, injury to other 
supplying member countries". This, without doubt, 
will be one of the issues that need to be resolved in 
the WTO's dispute settlement proceedings. 
The preference granted to developing countries in 
item 11 of the US proclamation will not, in principle, 
give grounds for differing views as the terms stipu- 
lated by the United States comply with Article 9 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards: "Safeguard measures 
shall not be applied ... as long as its share of imports 
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of the product concerned in the importing Member 
does not exceed 3 per cent, provided that developing 
country Members with less than 3 per cent import 
share collectively account for not more than 9 per 
cent of total imports of the product concerned." 
However, one issue that may arise in this context is 
how exactly the term "developing countries" should 
be defined. 
Whether the steel conflict can be brought to a 
mutually satisfactory solution in the months ahead - 
and if so, how - will be very significant for the further 
development of the world trade system as we know it 
today. This dispute not only concerns an important 
traded good, but it also involves two trading partners 
who play the role of vanguard in the on-going devel- 
opment of a world trading order. 
Georg Koopmann* 
Transatlantic Trade Under Fire 
he United States is by far the most important 
rading partner of the European Union, taking 
nearly one fourth of its exports and supplying one fifth 
of its imports. The EU, for its part, is the second- 
largest trading partner of the USA, "sandwiched" 
between Canada and Mexico (the two other NAFTA 
members), each of which accounts for roughly one 
fifth of US exports and imports. Among the trade 
flows between the world's largest regions (East and 
South Asia, North America, Western Europe), the 
transatlantic one, comprising the trade between the 
NAFTA area and the European Economic Area 
(including the EU and EFTA states), is the second- 
biggest flow (with one twelfth of total world trade) 
after transpacific trade between North America and 
Asia (with one tenth of total world trade). If interre- 
gional trade is more strictly considered in terms of 
bilateral trade among countries or political entities, 
trade between the USA and the EU is the largest item 
by a wide margin. As shown in Figure 1, it is almost 
twice the value of US-Japanese trade (the second- 
largest bilateral interregional trade flow) and more 
than three times as large as the EU-Japanese flow 
(the third-largest one). 
Expanding Transatlantic Production Networks 
In the field of foreign direct investment (FDI), EU-US 
economic links are even closer than in the area of 
foreign trade. The US economy has gained ever- 
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growing significance for both outgoing and ingoing 
EU FDI flows. In consequence, almost 50% of the FDI 
stocks controlled by EU companies in third countries 
are located in the USA while even 55% of third- 
country controlled FDI within the EU originates in the 
USA. Conversely, EU member states combine nearly 
two thirds of total inward FDI stocks in the USA (as 
against less than 60% a decade ago) and 45% (43%) 
of outward US FDI. In a global perspective, bilateral 
FDI between the EU and the USA clearly dominates 
FDI links between the world regions (Figure 2). 
Transatlantic direct investment and trade flows are 
also closely interwoven and complement (rather than 
substitute) each other. For example, US subsidiaries 
in the EU undertake about one fifth of total EU trade 
of manufactures with the USA (more or less evenly 
distributed between exports to and imports from the 
USA) while EU subsidiaries in the USA are responsible 
for almost one third of US manufacturing imports from 
the EU and one eighth of US manufacturing exports to 
the EU. Most of this trade is intra-company supplies 
of parts and components for further processing. 
These shipments have grown faster than at-arm's- 
length sales among unrelated companies and thus 
more quickly than total EU-US trade. Expanding 
production networks between the EU and the USA 
also involve a growing overall economic significance 
of each other's companies in the respective host 
economies. For instance, affiliates of European firms 
in the USA and American owned subsidiaries in the 
EU now account for approximately one tenth of total 
US and EU employment in manufacturing respec- 
tively. 
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